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ABSTRACT: After regulating Greenhouse Gas emissions from air transport, the 
European Union is now contemplating taking action on emissions from the shipping 
sector. In order to do so, the European Commission carried out a public consultation 
process between January and April 2012. This article analyses the legal problems that 
would arise, in the light of Public International Law, should the European Union decide 
to follow the path of aviation and include shipping under the European Emission 
Trading Scheme (ETS). To do so, the focus will be placed on six different normative 
bodies of international law: (1) the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the Kyoto Protocol;(2) the MARPOL Convention; (3) the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea; (4) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and 
the General Agreement on Trade of Services; (5) the principle of sovereignty over 
maritime areas; and (6) the bilateral agreements ratified by the EU containing clauses on 
maritime transport. The structure of each of the six normative bodies will be as follows: 
international commitments under each international norm, possibility of enforcement 
before tribunals and analysis of the legality of the EU measure in relation to that norm. 
 
                                                
1 This article is an updated version of the master’s degree thesis presented by the author to the College of 
Europe (Bruges) in June 2012. The author is grateful to Mr. Nicola Notaro (European Commission) and 
Mr. Ángel J. Rodrigo Hernández (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) for their comments on early drafts of this 
article. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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RESUM: Una vegada regulades les emissions de gasos d’efecte hivernacle del transport 
aeri, la Unió Europea es planteja ara actuar sobre les emissions del sector de transport 
marítim, pel que entre gener i abril de 2012 va dur a terme un procediment de consulta 
pública. En aquest article analitzarem els problemes legals que es plantejarien, a la llum 
del Dret Internacional Públic, si la Unió Europea optés per, seguint el camí de l’aviació, 
incloure el transport marítim en el Sistema Europeu de Comerç d’Emissions (ETS). Per 
a això, s’estudien un total de 6 normes internacionals – (1) la Convenció Marc de 
Nacions Unides contra el canvi Climàtic i el Protocol de Kyoto; (2) la Convenció 
MARPOL; (3) la Convenció de les Nacions Unides sobre Dret del Mar; (4) l’Acord 
General de Tarifes i Comerç i l’Acord General de Comerç de Serveis; (5) el principi de 
sobirania a l’àrea marina i; (6) els acords bilaterals de la UE amb clàusules sobre 
transport marítim. Dins de cada apartat, s’analitzen els compromisos internacionals 
adquirits, les possibilitats de fer valer la norma internacional davant els tribunals i la 
legalitat de la mesura europea en relació amb tal norma. 
 
RESUMEN: Una vez reguladas las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero del 
transporte aéreo, la Unión Europea se plantea ahora actuar sobre las emisiones del 
sector de transporte marítimo, para lo que entre enero y abril de 2012 llevó a cabo un 
procedimiento de consulta pública. En este artículo se abordarán los problemas legales 
que podrían surgir, a la luz del Derecho Internacional Público, si la Unión Europea 
optara por, siguiendo el camino de la aviación, incluir el transporte marítimo en el 
Sistema Europeo de Comercio de Emisiones (ETS). Para ello, se estudian un total de 6 
cuerpos jurídicos internacionales – (1) la Convención Marco de Naciones Unidas contra 
el cambio Climático y el Protocolo de Kioto; (2) la Convención MARPOL; (3) la 
Convención de Naciones Unidas sobre Derecho del Mar; (4) el Acuerdo General de 
Tarifas y Comercio y el Acuerdo General de Comercio de Servicios; (5) el principio de 
soberanía en el área marina y; (6) los acuerdos bilaterales de la UE con cláusulas sobre 
transporte marítimo. Dentro de cada apartado, se analizan los compromisos 
internacionales adquiridos, las posibilidades de hacer valer la norma internacional ante 
los tribunales y la legalidad de la medida europea en relación con tal norma. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since January 2012 carbon dioxide emissions delivered by commercial flights taking off 
or landing at European airports are covered by the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme.2 This decision, the legality of which has been accepted by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union,3 has created major controversies between the European Union 
and its main trade partners,4 notably in relation to the inclusion in the system of non-
                                                
2 Directive 2008/101/EC, 19 November 2008, amending Directive 2003/87/EC, so as to include aviation 
activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, [2009] 
O.J. L 8/3. In principle, allowances will need to be surrendered by airlines before April 2013. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that on 12 November 2012, the EU Commissioner for Climate Action, 
Connie Hedegeaard, proposed to suspend the entry into force of the scheme for international flights in 
order to facilitate reaching an international agreement at ICAO level on a global market-based mechanism 
for international air traffic. It seems that this decision will not, at first glance, solve the problem of 
potential breaches of the EU scheme by Chinese airlines, whose government has banned them from 
taking part in the scheme, because a flight from one EU city to another one operated by a Chinese 
company will still fall under the EU ETS. 
3 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America. Not yet reported. Judgement of 21 December 
2011. 
4 See, for example, “EU emission tax may trigger aviation trade war”, China Daily, 6 January 2012; 
“China prohíbe a sus aerolíneas que paguen por las emisiones de CO2”, El País, 6 February 2012; “Taxe 
carbone: la Chine s’oppose à l’UE”, Le Monde, 6 February 2012; “Europe flies into clean air turbulence”, 
Financial Times, 7 February 2012; “Chinese threaten to cancel Airbus orders in ETS row”, European 
Voice, 11 March 2012. 
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European airlines. This division has also extended among scholars, who are now 
involved in widespread debate.5  
The “carbon war” could soon spread to include the battlefield of shipping, since the 
European Union intends to regulate carbon emissions from ships in a similar way.6 If 
this option were to be enacted, it would constitute another major step in EU climate 
policy because greenhouse gas (GHG hereinafter) emissions from ships represent 3.3% 
of global carbon emissions.7 Throughout this article, the goal is to analyse the legality 
of the potential inclusion of GHG emissions from ships in the European Emission 
Trading Scheme. 
 
 
                                                
5  See, for example: KULOVESI, K., “Make Your Own Special Song, Even if Nobody Else Sings Along:  
International Aviation Emissions and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme”, Climate Law, Vol. 2, No. 4, 
2011; CLEMENT-WILZ, L., “Le système européen d’échange de quotas d’émission de gaz à effet de 
serre face aux règles du droit international”, Revue des affaires européennes, 2011, pp.859-867; MAYER, 
B., “A defense of the EU Emission Trading Scheme in aviation activities”, National University of 
Singapore, Centre of International Sustainable Development Law, Working Papers Series, November 
2011; HAVEL, B.F. & MULLIGAN, J.Q, “The Triumph of Politics: Reflections on the Judgment of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union: validating the inclusion of non-EU airlines in the Emission 
Trading Scheme”, Air and Space Law, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2012, pp. 3-33; BARTELS, L., “The Inclusion of 
Aviation in the EU ETS: WTO Law considerations”, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Trade and Sustainable Energy Series No. 6, April 2012; MELTZER, J., “Climate Change 
and Trade – The EU Aviation Directive and the WTO”, Journal of International Economic Law 15 2012, 
1, pp. 111-156; NKUEPO, H.J., “EU ETS Aviation Discriminates Against Developing Countries”, 
Africa’s Trade Law, Issue: 7, April 2012, pp.1-6; SCOTT, J., & RAJAMANI, L., “EU Climate change 
Unilateralism: International Aviation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme”, European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2012, pp.1-31; TUNTENG, V. et al., “Legal Analysis on the inclusion 
of civil aviation on the European Union Emissions Trading System”, Centre for International Sustainable 
Development Law, Brief, 2012; MAYER, B., “Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and 
Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change”, Common Market Law Review, vol 49, n 3 
2012, pp.1113-1139; PROUTEAU, J., “ Gaz à effet de serre et activités aériennes : le système d’échange 
de quotas au prisme du droit international entre compatibilité juridique et affrontement politique ”, Revue 
Lamy droit des affaires 2012, nº 71 pp.75-78; ATHEN, M., "Hinterm Horizont geht’s weiter! 
Einbeziehung des Luftverkehrs in den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionszertifikaten” Europäische 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2012, pp.337-341. 
6 “Commission sets sight on including shipping on the EU ETS”, European Voice, 8 March 2012; for a 
detailed analysis see: RINGBOM, H., “Global problem – Regional solution? International Law 
Reflections on an EU CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme for Ships”, The International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 2011, 26, p. 619. 
7 IMO, Second GHG Study, 2009, p.29; in 2006, international shipping generated 870 MT, which 
amounts to 2.7% of world emissions in 2007, whereas domestic shipping causes 180 MT (0.6% of the 
world total). However, this number is not without controversy, and some studies have suggested it could 
be much higher: the Institut für Physik der Atmosphäre estimated carbon emissions from ships to 
represent 5% of world emissions in 2007 and British Petrol Marine considers that ships cause 4% of the 
global total (Source: “CO2 output from shipping twice as much as airlines”, The Guardian, 3 March 
2007) whereas a UN report leaked in 2008 considered that they amounted to 4,5% of world emissions -
1.12 Bn tonnes. (Source: “True scale of CO2 emissions from shipping revealed”, The Guardian, 13 
February 2008).  
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II. THE CURRENT EUROPEAN REGIME 
The EU has globally committed to reduce its carbon emissions by 20% or more in 
2020.8 As far as shipping is concerned, back in 2003 the European Commission was 
supposed to regulate carbon emissions if no action was adopted internationally by the 
end of that year.9 However, no legislative measures were taken.  
Nowadays, several provisions provide for a new mandate to the EU to regulate 
emissions from ships in 2013 if no international agreement is reached.10 This time, it is 
expected that legislation will come into force.11 In addition, the 2011 White Paper on 
Transport states that shipping emissions need to be reduced by at least 40% in 2050.12  
Since no international agreement was made either at the Durban Conference of the 
Parties (COP thereinafter) 17 or by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the 
European Commission opened a consultation process on 19 January 2012, which was 
closed on 12 April 2012,13 in an attempt to explore different ways of regulating carbon 
emissions from ships. In particular, four policy options were considered: a 
compensation fund, inclusion in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, a fuel or carbon tax 
and a mandatory emissions reduction for every ship. Not surprisingly, countries like 
China are already opposing any unilateral action the EU may take.14 
In February 2012 the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) invited "the 
Commission to prepare a reflection paper by June (2012) on the carbon pricing of 
global aviation and maritime transportation”15, which draws the conclusion that the 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS hereinafter) option could be the one that EU 
                                                
8 Conclusions of the European Council, 8-9 March 2007, para 32. Doc 7224/1/07, 2.05.2007. 
9 Article 5(2)(iii)(b) of Decision 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 22 July 
2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environmental Action Programme [2002] O.J. L.242/1. 
10 Recital 3 of Directive 2009/29/EC, 5 June 2009, amending Directive 2003/87/EC to improve and 
extend the GHG emission allowance trading scheme in the Community, [2009] OJ L140; Recital 2 of the 
Decision 406/2009/EC of the EP and the Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort of MS to reduce their 
GHG emissions, [2009] O.J. L140. 
11 “Commission sets sight on including shipping on the EU ETS”, European Voice, 8 March 2012. 
12 Commission White Paper “Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and 
resource efficient transport system” 28 March 2011, COM(2011) 144 final, 2.3, para 29. 
13 European Commission: Public Consultation for “Including maritime transport emissions in the EU’s 
greenhouse gas commitment”, 19 January-12 April 2012. 
14 “China protests EU shipping carbon tax”, Beijing Review, 2 March 2012, available at: 
<http://www.bjreview.com.cn/headline/txt/2012-03/02/content_429781.htm>,  retrieved on 5.03.2012. 
15 Council Conclusions: Climate finance - follow-up to the Durban Conference 3148th Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 21 February 2012, para 6. 
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institutions have in mind, although the final decision does not seem to have been made 
yet.16 
Several international provisions could clash with the inclusion of shipping in the EU 
ETS. They will be analysed in turn, following a three-step approach. First, the 
international provisions will be identified. Second, the question of enforceability will be 
addressed. Thirdly, the legality of the European measure will be examined in relation to 
international norms. 
 
III. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE (UNFCCC) AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
1. International commitments 
An international agreement on emissions from ships and airplanes was not reached 
when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated. It was during the Copenhagen Summit of 
2009 that the possibility of regulating emissions from ships was at last extensively 
discussed.17 The EU proposed a 20% reduction in emissions from ships for 2020 in 
relation to 2005 levels.18 Nevertheless, an agreement was not concluded, since the US 
and some developing countries strongly opposed any numerical compromise. 
                                                
16 At the meeting on “Green ports, green shipping”, (http://www.greens-efa.eu/green-ports-green-
shipping-7458.html) hosted in Brussels by MEP Nikos Chrysogelos on 27 June 2012, and which was 
attended by the author, the representative of the European Commission stated that there was still no final 
decision on what policy option to choose with regards to regulating emissions from shipping. Moreover, 
in September 2012, Ms. Elina Bardam, head of the international carbon market unit of the European 
Commission, said: “We are including different types of measures, ranging from measurement, reporting 
and verification, to technical standards, to setting baselines. These options are all on the table. (…) The 
ETS-type schemes are part of the options that are being considered.” (See “EU to present proposal to 
curb carbon emissions from shipping”, Bloomberg, 18 September 2012, available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-09-18/eu-to-present-proposal-to-curb-co2-emissions-from-
shipping-1-.html, last retrieved on 18 September 2012); in any event, according to the latest news, it 
seems very unlikely that the EU will regulate carbon emissions from ships before the end of 2012 (See 
“EU plan to tackle ships’ CO2 unlikely this year”, ENDS Europe, 18 September 2012, available at: 
<http://www.endseurope.com/29601/eu-plan-to-tackle-ships-co2-unlikely-this-year>, last retrieved on 19 
September 2012). 
17 According to Transport & Environment, “more discussion amongst countries in bunker fuel at the 
UNFCCC occurred in the past three months than during the past ten years” (“Aviation and Shipping 
Emissions After Copenhagen”, Euractiv, 12 January 2010,  available on-line: 
<http://www.euractiv.com/transport/aviation-and-shipping-emissions-after-copenhagen-analysis-201893>  
retrieved on 21.01.2012). 
18 “EU proposes global aviation and shipping targets for Copenhagen”, Transport & Environment, 16 
November 2009, available at: <http://www.transportenvironment.org/news/eu-proposes-global-aviation-
and-shipping-targets-copenhagen>,  retrieved on 21 February 2012. 
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The issue was again discussed in Cancun COP 16, but no agreement on shipping 
emissions was reached either,19 although a draft regulation was provided for in the 
chair’s proposal20 and in later drafts.21 In Durban COP 17, NGOs proposed – and the 
International Chamber of Shipping agreed – to use the revenues obtained by taxing 
global shipping emissions to establish the Green Climate Fund agreed in COP 16.22 The 
parties welcomed the developments made by IMO – notably, the Energy Efficiency 
Design Index (EEDI) and Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) – but, 
even though the EU tried hard,23 nothing specific in relation to funding was agreed 
because of opposition from the US and India.  
As a result, the Kyoto Protocol does not apply to either air or maritime transport. It only 
states that greenhouse gases from these two means of transport shall be limited in an 
agreement between the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and IMO.24 
The United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) applies to all sectors 
that deliverg greenhouse carbon emissions, including transport.25 However, no specific 
obligations are provided for in the Convention in relation to emissions from transport. 
In conclusion, only two general international commitments stemming from the 
UNFCC/Kyoto obligations could conflict with the inclusion of shipping in the EU ETS: 
                                                
19 Report by the CoP on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010 
(FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1) and Report by the CoP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its sixth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010 
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.1). 
20 Paras 35-37 of the “Preparation of an outcome to be presented to the CoP for adoption at its sixteenth 
session to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term 
cooperative action now, up to and beyond 2012, Possible elements of the outcome, Note by the Chair”, 24 
November 2010 (FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/CRP.1). 
21 Paras 41-43 of the “Preparation of an outcome to be presented to the CoP for adoption at its sixteenth 
session to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term 
cooperative action now, up to and beyond 2012, Possible elements of the outcome Note by the Chair”, 4 
December 2010 (FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/CRP.2). 
22 OXFAM/WWF, Out of the Bunker: time for a fair deal on carbon emissions, 8 September 2011. 
23 “EU to push for inclusion of shipping and aviation emissions in climate Treaty at Durban”, Climate 
Connect, 21 November 2011, available at <http://www.climate-connect.co.uk/Home/?q=node/1514> 
retrieved on 22.02.2012. 
24 Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. 
25 Ibidem, Article 4(1)(c). 
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the common but differentiated responsibilities principle26 (CBDR) and article 2(2) of 
the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
2. Enforcement 
There are three requirements that an international provision needs to fulfil in order to be 
a criterion for validity of EU law: the EU must be bound by it, the nature and the logic 
of the agreement must not preclude direct effect and the specific provision needs to be 
precise, clear and unconditional. 
When it comes to the first condition, the Court of Justice (CJ or CJEU) made clear in 
the ATAA Case that the Kyoto Protocol, in so far as it has been ratified by the European 
Union,27 “forms an integral part of EU law”28 and is binding upon the Union.” 
However, the other two requirements for direct effect of the Kyoto Protocol are not met.  
First, the CJ considered that two factors preclude the direct effect of the Kyoto Protocol: 
the flexibility of the emission reduction commitments and the fact that the conference of 
the parties had imposed non-compliance mechanisms.29 Second, the relevant provision, 
article 2(2), is not worded in sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional terms, so it 
cannot be directly effective.30 As a consequence of the non-fulfilment of these 
conditions, the Kyoto Protocol cannot be enforced before the CJEU in order to seek a 
declaration of invalidity of an EU internal law provision.31 In the ATAA case, even if the 
Kyoto Protocol had been deemed to be directly effective, there was another burden to 
                                                
26 Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC. The CBDR principle was first declared in Principle 7 of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, June 1992 and it has also been provided for in article 10 
of the Kyoto Protocol. 
27 Council Decision 2002/358/EC of 25 April 2002 concerning the  approval, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
the joint fulfillment of commitments thereunder, [2002] O.J. L 130. 
28 Case C-366/10, cit. note 3, para 73; this principle was first declared in a case concerning the EU-Greece 
Association Agreement: Case 181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, para. 5. 
29 Case C-366/10, cit. note 3, paras 75-76; c.f Case 149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I – 8425, 
paras 41-47. 
30 Idem, para 77. 
31 Idem, para 78. 
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overcome, which was the fact that some of the individuals invoking it were US 
companies, whose country is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol.32 
With regards to the UNFCCC, and in particular, the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities, there is no doubt that it also constitutes a part of EU 
law,33 but it is likely that its nature precluded direct effect, since it is formulated in even 
less concrete terms than the Kyoto Protocol, there are no strict enforcement mechanisms 
and the commitments undertaken by the Parties are flexible. Even though the CJEU did 
not address the issue of the direct effect of UNFCCC, since the principle of Common 
But Differentiated Responsibilities was not raised, Advocate General Kokkott seems to 
suggest a negative answer in her Opinion in the ATTAA case: 
“Neither the [United Nations] Framework Convention [on Climate Change] nor 
the Kyoto Protocol contains specific provisions that could directly affect the legal 
status of an individual. There are no more than a few general references to 
‘humankind’ and ‘humans’ in these legal instruments.”34 
Nevertheless, even if as a matter of EU law the Kyoto Protocol cannot render secondary 
law void, the EU is still internationally bound by that international agreement35 and it is 
relevant, at least from a theoretical point of view, to see whether the EU is in breach of 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. As the CJEU stated in Racke: 
“The rules invoked (…) form an exception to the pacta sunt servanda principle, 
which constitutes a fundamental principle of any legal order and, in particular, the 
international legal order. Applied to international law, that principle requires that 
                                                
32 GEHRING, M., “Air Transport Association of America v. Energy Secretary before the European Court 
of Justice: Clarifying Direct Effect and Guidance for Future Instrument Design for a Green Economy in 
the EU”, Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, forthcoming 2012, p.5. 
33 Council Decision 94/69/EC, of 15 December 1993, concerning the conclusion of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate change, OJ L 33/13. 
34 AG Kokott Opinion in C-366/10, delivered 6 October 2011, para 82. 
35 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 1969, Vienna, 23 May 1969 and 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations 1986, Vienna, 21.03.1986. Even if the EU is not a 
signatory of any of these Conventions, it is submitted that the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” 
constitutes a principle of customary law which is binding upon the European Union. Article 351 TFEU 
takes account of this principle and allows Member States to derogate from the principle of primacy of EU 
law in order to meet previous international obligations. Moreover, it could be argued that the “pacta sunt 
servanda” principle is similar to the EU principle of legitimate expectations, which forms an integral part 
of EU law (Case 112/77 Töpfer v Commission [1978] ECR 1019, para. 19). For a discussion on article 18 
of the Vienna Convention, see  Case T-115/94 Opel Austria v. Council [1997] ECR II-43, paras 76-79 
and 92-95; and on article 31 of the Vienna Convention, see Opinion 1/91 of the Court of  Justice on the 
EEA Agreement [1991]  ECR I-6079, para 14; Case C-312/91 Metalsa [1993]  ECR  I-3751, paragraph 
12; and Case 386/08 Brita [2010] ECR I-01289, paras 40-44. 
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every treaty be binding upon the parties to it and be performed by them in good 
faith.”36 
Although very unlikely, the EU could accept the arbitration procedure provided for in 
UNFCCC37 or Member States could submit the dispute to the International Court of 
Justice.38 
 
3. Legality of the EU measure 
3.1. The CBDR principle 
This principle obliges developed countries to lead the fight against climate change, 
since “the largest historical share of historical and current global greenhouse gases has 
originated in developed countries.”39 Even if it is commonly considered that this 
principle has not achieved the status of customary principle of international law yet,40 
the European Union has recognised the CBDR principle, although it has also insisted 
that:  
“(...) all developing countries, except least developed countries (LDCs), should 
commit to adopting low-carbon development strategies by the end of 2011. These 
strategies should set out a credible pathway to limit the country’s emissions 
through nationally appropriate mitigation actions that cover all key emitting 
sectors, especially the power sector, transport, major energy-intensive industries 
and, where significant, forests and agriculture.”41 
According to the impact assessment presented by the European Commission 
accompanying the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS:  
“It is important to note that the measure would be fully in line with the principle of 
«common but differentiated responsibilities» under the UNFCCC. Incorporation of 
aviation emissions from routes to/from EU airports into the EU ETS would first of 
all be a measure taken by the Community as an Annex I Party to the UNFCCC. In 
                                                
36 Case 162/96 Racke [1998] ECR I-03655 para 49. 
37 Article 14(2)(b) UNFCCC. 
38 Idem, Article 14(2)(a). 
39 Idem, Recital 3. 
40 SCOTT, J., & RAJAMANI, L., “EU Climate change…”,  cit. note 5. 
41  Commission Communication “Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen”, 
COM(2009) 39 final, p. 5. 
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terms of the economic impacts, a larger proportion of compliance costs would 
naturally be borne by Annex I carriers as they generally have a higher market share 
on the routes covered. However, carriers from developing countries that are able to 
operate in competition with Annex I carriers on such routes would of course need 
to be covered in order to avoid a) distortions of competition and b) discrimination 
as to nationality in line with the Chicago Convention.”42 
Developing countries have argued that the EU ETS would need to take the CBDR 
principle into account.43 The issue was not raised in the aviation case,44 because the 
claimants were US and Canadian companies, but it could be raised in the future if China 
starts proceedings in Germany as it has threatened to do.45 
Firstly, as it has been argued elsewhere,46 this principle is to some extent to be found in 
the ETS, in so far as operators can substitute allowances by achieving reductions of 
emissions in developing countries47 and they “shall support capacity building activities 
in developing countries.”48  
Secondly and more importantly, this principle must be accommodated with other 
environmental principles, comprising, amongst others, the “polluter pays” principle.49 
                                                
42  Commission staff working document - Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation 
activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community - Impact 
Assessment of the inclusion of aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community, SEC/2006/1684, at point 36 
43  Statement by Chinese Air Transport Association on Inclusion of International Aviation in the EU  ETS, 
03 October 2011 available at: http://www.wcarn.com/list/13/13140.html (last retrieved on 14 September 
2012) It states that: “This unilateral action of EU does not provide legitimate arrangements for airlines in 
developing countries, gravely  violates the universally accepted principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility in the area of combating climate change, and the provision of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention)”; Proposals by India for inclusion of additional 
agenda items in the provisional agenda of the seventeenth session of the Conference of the Parties, 
FCCC/CP/2011/INF.2/Add.1, 7 October 2011, p. 6 (mentioned in SCOTT, J., & RAJAMANI, L., “EU 
Climate change…”, p.13). 
44 C-366/10, cit. note 3. 
45 El País, cit. note 4 
46 KREMLIS, M. “The inclusion of shipping industry in the EU ETS”, European Energy and 
Environmental Law Review, June 2010, p. 151. 
47 Such as the JI and CDM. See Article 11(b) Directive 2003/87 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, [2009] 
O.J. L 140/63; see also the article published in this review: FERNANDEZ EGEA, R., “The flexible 
mechanisms to combat climate change: a critical view of their legitimacy”, Revista Catalana de Dret 
Ambiental, Vol 2, no. 2, 2011. 
48 Ibidem, Article 21a. 
49 Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 1992. 
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The situation at stake does not relate to States, but to private actors, whose links with 
States are far from clear.50 Many ships do not have a real link with the country they 
were flagged under, and some companies establish themselves in a certain country 
because of tax and labour advantages.51 It is submitted that in a case such as the present 
one, which concerns the relations between a State and private operators who pollute, the 
polluter pays principle prevails over the CBDR principle.52 
Furthermore, the Second IMO GHG Study states that:  
“the ownership and management chain surrounding ship operations can involve 
many players, located in various countries. In addition, the registration of a ship 
can move between jurisdictions several times over its lifetime. It is worth 
noticing that about three quarters of the world tonnage, by dead weight, of all 
merchant vessels engaged in international trade is registered in developing 
countries (not in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol), hence making it a large portion 
of the world fleet; it would be ineffective for any regulatory regime to act only 
on the remaining portion, namely one quarter of the world fleet.”53 
This line of reasoning has been followed by the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee of the International Maritime Organization, which has clearly established 
that the CBDR principle shall not apply to IMO regulations, because they must be: 
                                                
50  In the case of aviation, it is argued that there is a certain link between companies and States, many of 
them being state-owned or recently privatized companies. However, as far as shipping is concerned, the 
link between the State of flagging and the vessel is not so straightforward. This is due to the phenomenon 
commonly referred to as “flags of convenience”, which is manifested by the distinction between the 
“registering country” – to whose regulation the vessels are bound and whose flag they carry – and the 
“controlling country” – the country of ownership, with the true controlling interest. This practice can be 
observed by looking at the list of countries by number of vessels flagged: Panama leads the table with 
22.6% of the world fleet registered there (and with only 0.048% of the world population), followed by 
Liberia (10.5% of the world fleet and 0.06% of the world population), Greece (5.5% and 0.15%), 
Bahamas (5.3% and 0.005%) and Marshall Islands (5.3% and 0.0007%). According to UNCTAD, 
66.35% of the world vessels were registered in a foreign country (Source: 2008 Review of Maritime 
Transport, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 
51 For example, MSC, one of the biggest shipping companies in the world, has its headquarters in 
Switzerland, a land-locked country. 
52 See also BEYERLIN, U. and MARAUHN, T., International Environmental Law, Hart Publishing, 
2011, p.64; for a contrary argument, in relation to aviation, see SCOTT, J., & RAJAMANI, L., “EU 
Climate change…”, cit. note 5. It has even been argued that the inclusion of aviation creates a greater 
burden for developing than for developed countries, because of the technical progress needed to reduce 
emissions and improve the efficiencies of airplanes: NKUEPO, “EU ETS Aviation…”, cit. note 5; for a 
detailed analysis of how the inclusion of aviation impacts airlines from each country, see MULLER, B., 
“From confrontation to collaboration? CBDR and the EU ETS aviation dispute with developing 
countries” Oxford Energy and Environment Brief, February 2012. This last author shows that 65.2% of 
the air transport emissions covered will be caused by EU27 + Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland airlines, 
10.1% by USA airlines, and only 2.8% and 1.1% by Chinese and Indian airlines, respectively. 
53 IMO, “Second GHG...”, cit. note 7, para 2.45. 
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“global in nature and applicable to all relevant ships, with appropriate 
differences, if any, to be based on factors such as their type, manning and 
operational features, irrespective of the flag they are flying or the degree of 
development of the flag State or the State of nationality of the owner or 
operator.”54 
 
3.2. Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol 
This article provides for an obligation for countries in Annex I to: 
“pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of GHG not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the 
ICAO and the IMO respectively.”55  
This is the case of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons, the gases 
currently covered by the EU ETS.56 
It is submitted that the obligation established by article 2(2) is not an absolute one and it 
cannot be interpreted as conferring exclusive competence to regulate emissions from 
ships to IMO. 
This article was also relevant in the ATAA case, but the CJEU did not address the 
problem, since it concluded that the Kyoto Protocol had no direct effect,57 so there was 
no need to analyse its material provisions. Nevertheless, AG Kokott did mention the 
issue and said that: 
“There is (…) no congruity between the parties to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol on the one hand and the parties to the Chicago Convention and the 
ICAO based upon it, on the other. If the ICAO were to have exclusive 
competence, those ICAO members who are not themselves bound by the Kyoto 
Protocol could impede the realisation of the Kyoto objectives.”58  
Therefore, she concludes that when the Kyoto Protocol was signed, the parties: 
                                                
54 MEPC, Legal Aspects of the Organization’s Work on Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Context of the 
Kyoto Protocol, 2008 (quoted by CLIENT EARTH, Legal implications of EU Action on GHG Emissions 
from the International Maritime Sector, November 2011). 
55 Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. 
56 Annex I to Directive 2009/29/EC of 5 June 2009, amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and 
extend GHG emission allowance trading scheme in the Community, [2009] OJ L140. 
57  C-366/10, cit. note 3, paras 73-78. 
58 AG Kokott Opinion, cit. note  34, para. 181. 
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“did not commit themselves (…) to pursuing the limitation or reduction of 
greenhouse gases from aviation exclusively by working through the ICAO”59. 
The same line of reasoning might apply to the relationship between the Kyoto Protocol 
and the International Maritime Organisation. Even if the outcome reached by AG 
Kokott appears to be pertinent, the reasoning she followed might be flawed. AG Kokott 
seems to imply that the only parties to the Kyoto Protocol are the countries who have 
undertaken specific emissions reduction commitments (Annex I countries) and that is 
the reason why this group of countries cannot reach a majority at ICAO/IMO. 
It is argued that a difference must be drawn between parties to the Kyoto Protocol (all 
the countries that have ratified it) and countries with specific reduction obligations 
under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex I countries). All the parties must contribute to the 
achievement of the objectives of the international agreements they ratify,60 even if only 
some countries have specific emissions reduction goals.  
Whereas the Kyoto Protocol has so far been ratified by 191 countries and the European 
Union,61 the International Maritime Organization is composed of 170 full members plus 
3 associate members.62 Both in ICAO63 and IMO,64 decisions are taken under the rule 
“one State one vote” and the required majority is simple majority. Since the ICAO and 
IMO members which have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol (mainly, the United States65) 
                                                
59 Ibidem, para. 182. 
60 This obligation stems from the “pacta sunt servanda” principle, laid down in Article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties, cit. note 35. 
61 UNFCCC, Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, available online: 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php  retrieved 05.06.2012. 
62 IMO, Status of Conventions, IMO, Status of Conventions at May 2012, available at: 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx, retrieved 05.06.2012.  
63 Article 48 c) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and Rules 43 and 45 of the Standing 
Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the ICAO, DOC 7600/6, adopted by the Assembly in 1952 
(Resolution A6-12; Doc 7670) and amended by the Assembly in 1953 (Doc 7409, A7-P/2, p. 42), 1959 
(Resolution A12-4; Doc 7998, A12-P/3), 1962 (Resolution A14-1; Doc 8268, A14-P/20), 1971 (Doc 
8963, A18-P/16), 1974 (Doc 9119, A21-P/4), 1977 (Doc 9216,  A22-P/10), 1980 (Doc 9317, A23-P/12), 
1989 (Doc 9550, A27-P/12) and 2007 (Doc 9891, A36-P/9 — in preparation). 
64 Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure of the IMO Assembly, Assembly Resolution A.27(II), of 13 April 
1961. 
65 Only the United States and the three IMO associate Members (Macao, Hong Kong and Faroe Islands) 
are members of the International Maritime Organization but have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. From 
15 December 2012, Canada will join this group of States, after stating that it wishes to withdraw from the 
Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, 22 countries (mainly landlocked States and very small islands) and 
the European Union have ratified the Kyoto Protocol but are not members of the International Maritime 
Organization: Armenia, Belarus, Bhutan, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Mali, Federated States of 
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do not have sufficient voting rights to prevent the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol from 
being achieved, in principle it is possible for emissions reductions to be adopted at the 
IMO level if all the parties to the Kyoto Protocol so decided.  
Article 2(2), when it provides for multilateral cooperation through IMO and ICAO in 
order to reduce emissions, refers only to Annex I countries, because the non-Annex I 
countries have no obligations to reduce their emissions. It would not be congruent with 
the rest of the Treaty to impose an obligation to reduce emissions through IMO and 
ICAO to countries which have no duty to reduce emissions at all. However, article 2(2) 
does not imply that non-Annex I countries are completely free to boycott IMO and 
ICAO attempts at reducing emissions. These countries, as signatories to the Kyoto 
Protocol, shall in principle ensure that the objectives of the international agreement can 
be fulfilled. 
In any case, reality shows that many non-Annex I countries have opposed the EU 
proposals at IMO level and it is unlikely that they could be held in breach of the Kyoto 
Protocol for not facilitating an agreement at the IMO level. 
The main argument in favour of concluding that article 2(2) would not be violated by 
the unilateral inclusion of shipping emissions in the EU ETS is that the Kyoto Protocol 
imposes only a bona fide obligation of due care, which in no case can become an 
obstacle for Annex I countries when they try to meet their emissions reductions goals. 
Since emissions from ships represent 3.3% of total emissions, the fulfilment of the 
reduction objectives would be jeopardised by article 2(2) if it were to be interpreted as 
conferring exclusive competence to IMO and ICAO. If it were considered that article 
2(2) would conflict with commitments under Annex B to the Protocol, the specific 
reduction objectives would prevail over the general-termed obligation to negotiate an 
agreement through ICAO and IMO. 
In addition, it cannot be forgotten that international organizations are based on the 
principle of conferral of competences, and IMO has not been given exclusive 
competence to regulate carbon emissions from ships. On the contrary, the EU remains 
                                                                                                                                          
Micronesia, Nauru, Niger, Niue, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Zambia. Other 
countries, such as Afghanistan, Andorra and Palestine, are not members to any of the two International 
Treaties. 
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competent under the Lisbon Treaty,66 an international agreement adopted after the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
Once it has been established that article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol only imposes a bona 
fide obligation to negotiate through ICAO and IMO, it shall be determined whether the 
duty of due care has been fulfilled. With regards to shipping, the answer must be in the 
affirmative, since the EU, through its Member States,67 has repeatedly tried to promote 
measures at international level through the Marine Environment Protection Committee 
at IMO.68 In fact, this obligation is also present in internal EU law. First, the Lisbon 
Treaty establishes as one of the environmental objectives the promotion of international 
agreements to fight environmental problems, and specifically those related to climate 
change.69 And second, the Effort Sharing Decision takes account of article 2(2) and 
provides for EU action only in the event that no international agreement is reached.70 
The Decision was adopted in April 2009, allowing for an international agreement to be 
concluded until 31 December 2011. The Marine Environment Protection Committee 
(MEPC) has in the meantime met five times,71 and only partial and insufficient 
measures have been adopted.72 
In addition, the Court of Justice has stated that the EU ETS system needs to be extended 
to all sectors in order for Directive 2003/8773 to comply with the equal treatment 
                                                
66 Article 4(2)(e) and article 192 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
67 The EU itself is neither a Member of IMO nor of ICAO, meaning that every proposal in relation to 
shipping emissions is the consequence of a previously agreed position of Member States. Internally, the 
EU remains competent for adopting measures for reducing emissions from maritime and air transport. 
68 The EU has has made several proposals for an agreement providing for specific emissions reductions to 
the Marine Environment Protection Committee, but so far it has not succeeded. For an account of the last 
meeting of the Committee, see, for example: “IMO Failure to tackle shipping emissions may force EU 
action”, Energy & Environmental Management, 6 March 2012, available at: 
<http://www.eaem.co.uk/news/imo-failure-tackle-shipping-emissions-may-force-eu-action>, last 
retrieved on 06 June 2012 
69 Article 191(1)(iv) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
70 Decision 406/2009 cit. note 10, Recital 2; it is to be noted that when the Decision refers to aviation it 
says that sufficient internal measures have already been taken (the inclusion in the ETS), when it refers to 
shipping the possibility of reaching an agreement at IMO level or in the framework of UNFCCC is 
expressly mentioned. 
71 The meetings were: MEPC 59 (July 2009), MEPC 60 (March 2010), MEPC 61 (October 2010), MEPC 
62 (July 2011) and MEPC 63 (March 2012). MEPC 64 meets in October 2012, after this article was sent, 
but an agreement on an efficient and comprehensive regulation to reduce shipping emissions is not to be 
expected. 
72 See section IV.1 of this article. 
73 Directive 2003/87, cit. note 47. 
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principle: “(the legislature) is obliged (...) to review the measures adopted, (...) at 
reasonable intervals, as is moreover provided for in article 30 of the directive 
(2003/87).”74 
In conclusion, if the EU decides to regulate emissions from ships in a unilateral manner 
in 2013, article 2(2) will not be breached. 
 
IV. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 
1. International commitments 
The International Maritime Organization, a UN agency established in 1948, promoted a 
Convention for the prevention of pollution from ships (the MARPOL Convention), 
which entered into force in 1973.  
In 1997 the MARPOL Conference adopted a Resolution on “Carbon dioxide emissions 
from ships”,75 inviting IMO to undertake a study on emissions by ships in order to 
contribute to the inventory of GHG emissions. The First Study was presented before the 
IMO Assembly of 2000.76 In 2006 it was agreed that the study needed to be reviewed, 
and in 2009 IMO presented a new report on shipping emissions.77 
The MARPOL Convention has six technical annexes, of which we shall focus on Annex 
VI,78 entitled “Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships”. Contrary to Annexes I and II, 
Annexes III to VI are ratified under a voluntary basis.79 
Annex VI sets limits for sulphur,80 nitrogen oxides,81 ozone depleting gases82 and 
volatile organic compounds.83 From 1 January 2013, a new Chapter 4 to Annex VI, 
                                                
74 Case C-127/07 Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others v. Premier Ministre, Ministre de 
l’Écologie et du Développement durable, Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie [2008] 
ECR I-09895, para 63. 
75 Resolution 8 to the 1997 Marpol Conference. 
76 IMO, MEPC 45/8 (2000). 
77 IMO, “Second GHG...”, cit. note 7. 
78 It entered into force on 19 May 2005 and was transposed at EU level by Directives 1999/32 and 
2005/33. 
79 Annex B to CE DELFT, Technical support for European action to reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
from international maritime transport, Delft, 2009, TENDER DG ENV/C3/ATA/2008/0016. 
80 Regulation 14, Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention. 
81 Ibidem, Regulation 13. 
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entitled “Regulations on energy efficiency of ships”, will establish international 
measures to reduce carbon emissions,84 following the recommendations of the Second 
IMO GHG Study.85 In order to do so, two main instruments have been implemented.  
Firstly, the new rules establish the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan 
(SEEMP),86 which intends ships to be sailed more efficiently – for example, with better 
speed management – in order to save fuel and reduce emissions.87 The SEEMP is based 
on five pillars: planning, implementation, monitoring, self-evaluation and voluntary 
reporting.88 It applies to all new and existing ships above 400 gross tonnes.89 Although 
the SEEMP is expected to increase environmental awareness among ship owners, it 
does not provide for compulsory reductions of emissions, and, without other measures, 
is not an appropriate instrument for tackling the increase in GHG emissions from ships.  
Secondly, new ships will be covered by the Energy Efficient Design Index (EEDI),90 
which imposes obligations on efficiency improvements for ships above 400 gross 
tonnes built after January 2013 or delivered after July 2015.91 They will have to 
improve energy efficiency per mile by 10% in 2013, by 20% in 2020 and by 30% after 
2025.92 This measure is expected to save 45-50 MT per year by 2020 – a reduction of 4-
                                                                                                                                          
82 Ibidem, Regulation 12. The Second IMO GHG Study (cit. note 7) notes that CFC emissions were 
reduced by 98%, HCFC by 78% and HFC by 315% between 1997 and 2006. 
83 Ibidem, Regulation 15. 
84 RESOLUTION MEPC.203(62), Amendments to the annex of the Protocol of 1997 to amend the 
international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 
1978 relating thereto, 15 July 2011. 
85 IMO, “Second GHG...”, cit. note 7. 
86 Regulation 22, Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention. 
87 IMO,  Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan, available at:  
<http://www.shippingandco2.org/SEEMP.htm  retrieved on 18.02.2012>. 
88 LLOYD’S REGISTER, Implementing a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan: guidance for ship-
owners and operators, (November 2011), p. 2 
89 A SEEMP is required to be kept on board and compliance is demonstrated by an International Energy 
Efficiency Certificate (IEEC). IMO has provided ships with guidelines to implement SEEMP: IMO, 
MEPC.1 / Circ 683 Guidance for the development of a ship energy efficiency management plan, 17 
August 2009. 
90 Regulation 21 of Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention and Guidelines MEP 1/Circ 681 Interim 
Guidelines on the method of calculation of the energy efficiency design index for new ships, 17 August 
2009. 
91 Some companies, such as the German Hapag-Lloyd have decided voluntarily to certify their whole fleet 
according to EEDI in advance. Source: Hapag-Lloyd, “Up to 27% reduction in CO2 emissions: Hapag-
Lloyd a trailblazer for the new EEDI”, 27 February 2012, available at: http://www.hapag-
lloyd.com/en/press_and_media/press_release_page_23940.html  retrieved on 04.03.2012. 
92 These are average figures. In fact, the emissions reduction depends on the type and size of the vessel. 
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5% of global shipping emissions. Nevertheless, developing countries have obtained a 6-
and-a-half-year exemption, which makes it likely that new ships built in developed 
countries will be flagged even more often under developing countries.93 In addition, 
only 68 countries have ratified Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention,94 which gives 
operators the opportunity to flag their vessels under more than 120 countries where 
these modest emissions requirements do not apply.  
Furthermore, taking into account that the average life age of the world fleet is 30 
years,95 the measure will not be fully applicable until 2043 (June 2049 in developing 
countries), which renders IMO’s reduction predictions too optimistic. What is more, this 
delay is an incentive for ship-owners to postpone the renewal of its fleet as much as 
possible, so the life of old and polluting vessels will be extended even more. 
At IMO’s MEPC 63 in March 2012, the question of establishing a market-based system 
was discussed,96 thanks to European pressure, but no agreement was reached and talks 
were postponed until October.97 
In conclusion, even if these developments are to be welcomed, since they have made 
shipping “the first industry with global climate standards,”98 further action, such as a 
global market based mechanism,99 is needed if a real reduction in carbon emissions 
from ships is to be achieved. 
In addition to the MARPOL Convention, there are some regional agreements, 
concluded by the EU or some Member States and third countries, which deal with 
                                                
93 TRANSPORT AND ENVIRONMENT, “Shipping becomes the first industry with global climate 
standard”, 20 July 2011. 
94 IMO, Status of Conventions on 31 March 2012, available at: 
<http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx>, retrieved 22 April 
2012. 
95 TRANSPORT AND ENVIRONMENT, “Shipping becomes...”, cit. note 93 
96 IMO MEPC 63rd, “Market-based measures for greenhouse gases from ships on agenda as IMO Marine 
Environment Protection Committee meets”, 22 February 2012, available at: 
<http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/07MEPC63preview.aspx>,  retrieved 4 March 
2012 
97 “IMO set to collide with EU over vessel CO2 emissions” Reuters, 3 March 2012, available at 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/03/shipping-carbon-idUSL5E8E23O420120303> retrieved 
04.03.2012. 
98 TRANSPORT AND ENVIRONMENT, Shipping becomes...”, cit. note 93. 
99 CE DELFT, “A global maritime emissions trading system”, January 2010, Delft, p. 82. 
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marine pollution, but they do not provide for measures to reduce atmospheric pollution 
from ships.100 
 
2. Enforcement 
Even though a proposal was made by the European Commission in 2002,101 the 
European Union is not yet a party to the International Maritime Organization. Article 4 
of the Convention on IMO restricts membership to States. The procedure to be followed 
to become a member depends on whether the applicant is a UN or a non-UN member.  
Since the EU is not an IMO party, it has not ratified the MARPOL Convention either, 
even though it is internally competent to take measures for the fulfilment of the 
obligations under the Convention. Moreover, the theory of succession of obligations, 
first and (so far) only used by the CJEU in International Fruit Company,102 is not 
applicable to the MARPOL Convention, because: 
“in the absence of a full transfer of the powers previously exercised by the 
Member States to the Community, the latter cannot, simply because all those 
States are parties to Marpol 73/78, be bound by the rules set out therein.”103  
The MARPOL Convention cannot be regarded as a codification of international 
customary law either.104 Therefore, the same result as for the Chicago Convention in the 
ATAA case applies here105: the MARPOL Convention is not internationally binding 
upon the EU,106 and, as a consequence, the first condition for direct effect is not met. In 
conclusion, the MARPOL Convention cannot be invoked before the CJEU to seek a 
declaration of invalidity of EU secondary law.  
This line of reasoning may be criticised, arguing that the CJEU should ascertain the 
EU’s competence on an article-by-article basis instead of a treaty-basis. The Court’s 
                                                
100 See, for example, the Bucharest Convention for the Black Sea, 1992 or the Barcelona Convention for 
the Mediterranean, 1976. 
101 Recommendation from COM to Council to open and conduct negotiation with IMO and ICAO on 
accession by the European Community (Doc 7826/02). 
102  Joint Cases 21 to 24/70 International Fruit Company and others v. Commission [1971] ECR 411. 
103 Case C-308/06 International Association of Independent Tanker Owners v Secretary of State for 
Transport [2008] OJ C183/2, para 49.  
104 Idem, para 51. See also AG Kokott Opinion in that case, delivered on 20 November.2007, para 39. 
105 Case C-366/10, cit. note 3, para 71. 
106 See also Case 379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, para 16. 
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reasoning has the consequence that States could be held internationally liable for 
breaching international treaties for whose fulfilment they are no longer competent any 
more. 
A second possibility, at least a theoretical one, would be to invoke the derogation from 
the principle of primacy provided in article 351 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) in relation to international obligations contracted by Member 
States prior to accession. Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention, where the 
international measures fighting air pollution from ships are provided for, entered into 
force on 19 May 2005.107 However, the specific measures regulating GHG emissions 
will not enter into force until 1 January 2013.108 Since Croatia has ratified the MARPOL 
Convention, comprising its Annex VI, and is expected to become a Member of the EU 
by 1 July 2013,109 the MARPOL Convention and its amendments would be an 
international obligation arising from an agreement concluded before accession.110 If the 
inclusion of shipping in the EU ETS were deemed to be contrary to the MARPOL 
Convention, Croatia should, in principle, be able to invoke art.351 TFEU to derogate 
from this EU law obligation and to apply the international agreement. However, the 
CJEU has followed an extremely restrictive line with regards to article 351111 and it is 
submitted that in a case such as the present one, the Court will probably dismiss the 
action by artificially and arbitrarily distinguishing between succession of obligations 
and successions of relations.112 It would consider that there has been a succession of 
                                                
107 International Maritime Organization, “Status of Conventions summary”, available at: 
<http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx>, last retrieved on 06 
June 2012. 
108 International Maritime Organization, “List of amendments expected to enter into force this year and in 
the coming years”, available at: <http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/Pages/Action-Dates.aspx>, last 
retrieved on 06 June 2012. 
109 Article 3(3) of the Treaty between the Member States of the European Union and the Republic of 
Croatia, concerning the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union [2008] OJ L. 112/10. 
110  Assuming that by “the day of accession” it is to be understood the day when a country joins the Union 
(July 2013 in the Croatian case) and not the date when the Accession Agreement is signed (June 2008).  
111 See, for example, C-10/61 Commission v. Italy [1962] ECR 7; C-158/91 Ministere Public et Direction  
de Travail et de l’Emploi v Levy [1993] ECR I-4287; C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal [2000] ECR I-
05171; C-205/06 Commission / Austria [2009] ECR I-1301, paras 42-43; C-467/98 Commission v. 
Denmark (Open Skies) [2002] ECR I-9519, paras 59-61; cf. MANZINI, P., “The priority of pre-existing 
Treaties of EC Member States within the framework of international law”, European Journal of 
International Law,, Vol. 12 No. 4, 2001, pp. 781-792. 
112 See Case 812/79 Attorney General v. Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, paras. 8-20; Joint cases 180 and 
266/80 Crujeiras Tome [1981] ECR 2997, para. 20; Case 181/80 Arbelaiz-Emazabel [1981] ECR 2961, 
paras. 10 and 30-31; c.f CHURCHILL, R.R. & FOSTER, N.G., “European Community Law and Prior 
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relations with regards to air pollution from ships, but not a succession of obligations, so 
the EU is not bound by MARPOL but Member States are no longer competent to fulfil 
the obligations contracted in MARPOL. 
Even if the EU is not a party to the MARPOL Convention and its provisions cannot be 
enforced before the CJEU, and considering that it is unlikely that the enforcement 
mechanisms of IMO could be used to impose sanctions upon Member States,113 the fact 
remains that Member States are still bound by the Convention and it is important to 
know whether they act in conformity with the international obligations they have 
contracted.  
 
3. Analysis of the legality of the EU measure 
For the purposes of this article the relevant provision is the MARPOL Convention, 
whose Annex VI will regulate GHG from ships from January 2013. As has been 
demonstrated in the first section of the MARPOL analysis, this regulation seeks to 
establish minimum requirements concerning ship design and ship management. These 
requirements do not establish any reduction objectives, nor do they impose any limits 
on the total emissions a ship delivers. In this regard, the international obligations are 
obligations of means, not of result, which cannot in any case be deemed to constitute 
total harmonization.  
MARPOL measures in general, and the SEEMP and EEDI in particular, constitute 
minimum harmonization standards beyond which the Parties can legislate. To mention a 
recent example, parliament proposed to unilaterally increase the sulphur limits set out 
by Regulation 14 in the EU, although the council finally managed to hold it back.114  
                                                                                                                                          
Treaty Obligations of Member States: the Spanish Fishermen’s Cases”, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, (1987) Vol. 36, Issue 03, pp. 504-524. 
113 See article 69 of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 1948. 
114  Regulation 14 of Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention imposes the following limits for the sulphur 
content of any fuel oil used on board ships: 4.50% m/m prior to 1 January 2012; 3.50% m/m on and after 
1 January 2012; and 0.50% m/m on and after 1 January 2020. These limits are derogated in the so-called 
“Emissions Control Areas”, where the maximum sulphur content is more limited: 1.50% m/m prior to 1 
July 2010; 1.00% m/m on and after 1 July 2010; and 0.10% m/m on and after 1 January 2015. The 
European Parliament called for a general 0.5% limit in all areas by 2015 and the Commission defended a 
0.1% limit in all areas for 2020, although in its proposal, it just transposed IMO limits: Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the 
sulphur content of marine fuels, SEC(2011) 918 final, pp. 9 and 13; for the Parliament proposal, see:  
“Parliament calls for tough limits on maritime pollution”, European Voice, 16 February 2012; finally, the 
Council succeeded in watering down the proposal and MARPOL sulphur limits were not reduced: 
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Another example is the possibility of criminal responsibility for accidental sea pollution 
casualties, which is not provided for by MARPOL, but which was adopted in the EU 
following pressure from the Spanish Government after the Prestige accident.115 This 
case led to the abovementioned Intertanko judgment,116 in which the AG and the CJEU 
had the opportunity to clarify the relation between the MARPOL Convention and EU 
law and they concluded that Directive 2005/35/EC established more stringent 
requirements, insofar as it permitted that persons other than the master and the owner of 
the vessel could be held liable for discharges resulting from damage and it permitted 
those persons to be judged not only in case of intentional discharge, but also when 
serious negligence had occurred. 
With regards to the harmonization established by MARPOL, AG Kokott pointed out 
that there could be complete harmonization in the sea areas regulated by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but this obligation derived from 
a remission to UNCLOS, not from MARPOL itself.117 With respect to the situation in 
which only the MARPOL Convention applied,118 she held: 
“It would therefore be going too far to claim, (…) that stricter protective 
provisions are possible only where Marpol 73/78 makes express provision 
for them. Even though the contracting States were unable to agree on such 
stricter rules, (…) it by no means follows that in Marpol 73/78 they agreed 
on a definitive standard of protection for all areas of the sea.”119 
                                                                                                                                          
“Europe tackles sulphur emissions from ships”, Euractiv, 24 May 2012, available at: 
http://www.euractiv.com/energy-efficiency/europe-cracks-sulphur-emissions-news-512957, last retrieved 
on 06 June 2012; see also: TRANSPORT & ENVIRONMENT, “Sulphur in marine fuels”, 25 January 
2012, available at: <http://www.transportenvironment.org/publications/sulphur-marine-fuels>, last 
retrieved on 06 June 2012 
115 Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and the Council,  of 7 September 2005, on ship-
source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements [2005] OJ L.255/11; see also “EU 
breaks with MARPOL and votes to criminalise accidental sea pollution casualty”, Mundo Marítimo, 22 
June 2004, available at: http://www.mundomaritimo.cl/noticias/eu-breaks-with-marpol-and-votes-to-
criminalise-accidental-sea-pollution-casualty, last retrieved on 06 June.2012  
116 Case 308/06, cit. note 103. 
117 AG Kokott Opinion in Intertanko, cit. note 104, para 122. 
118 Mainly the territorial sea, where UNCLOS does not limit the action of States. 
119 AG Kokott Opinion in Intertanko, cit. note 104, para 133. 
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Regrettably, the CJEU missed the opportunity to clarify the relationship between the 
MARPOL Convention and EU law, finishing its reasoning when it found that the 
MARPOL Convention could not be a criterion for the validity of EU secondary law.120  
Lacking further evidence, the author agrees with AG Kokott that the MARPOL 
Convention does not establish complete harmonization measures unless it expressly 
says so. 
As far as shipping GHG emissions are concerned, the wording of the new Regulations 
21 and 22 of Annex VI supports the statement that MARPOL merely establishes 
minimum harmonization. For example, in Regulation 21 (EEDI), para 5, a minimum 
power for propulsion is fixed, but nothing precludes a higher requirement.121 Moreover, 
nothing in the succinct wording of Regulation 22 suggests that further measures on 
shipping emissions are prohibited. 
Therefore, any EU regulation on GHG emissions from ships will have to allow vessels 
to comply with the SEEMP and EEDI requirements, but it can also fix more stringent 
requirements. Since the inclusion of shipping emissions in the EU ETS would impose 
an obligation of result, setting GHG emission reduction objectives, not of means,  
would not prevent vessels from reducing their emissions by having a SEEMP on board 
and by fulfilling the EEDI requirements. On the contrary, the inclusion of shipping in 
the EU ETS would reinforce the importance of EEDI and SEEPM, which could become 
useful tools for reducing emissions and selling EU carbon allowances. 
In conclusion, the MARPOL Convention is not binding upon the EU but, even if it 
were, it would not be violated by the inclusion of shipping in the EU ETS. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
120 C-308/06, cit. note 103, para 52. 
121 The text of the new Regulation 21.5 reads as follows: “For each ship to which this regulation applies,  
the installed propulsion power shall not be less than the propulsion power needed to maintain the 
manoeuvrability of the ship under adverse conditions as defined in the guidelines to be developed by the 
Organization”. 
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V. UNCLOS  
1. International commitments 
The United Nations Convention is regarded as the “cornerstone of international 
maritime law.”122 The EU has ratified it,123 together with the Member States. Therefore, 
the UNCLOS is one of the so-called “mixed agreements”.  
Environmental issues are addressed in Part XII of the Convention. As regards 
provisions on GHG emissions, UNCLOS only provides for a rather general 
commitment to agree on measures “to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment from or through the atmosphere.”124  
Other provisions, such as the right to innocent passage,125 the non-discrimination 
principle,126 the principle of “port state enforcement”127 and the levies that can be 
charged to foreign ships128 will be discussed when the legality of the EU measure is 
analysed. 
 
2. Enforcement 
The EU is a UNCLOS member, although the CJEU has stated that the Convention lacks 
direct effect and therefore it cannot be invoked for rendering provisions of EU 
secondary law invalid.129  
One way that countries or companies willing to challenge a measure for not complying 
with UNCLOS can circumvent this limitation could be to rely on the fact that UNCLOS 
is a mixed agreement and to challenge the part where there is national competence.130 
                                                
122  IMO, Shipping becomes...”, cit. note 7, p.18 
123 Council Decision 98/392/EC of 23 March 1998 concerning the conclusion by the European 
Community of the United Nations Convention of 10 December 1982 on the Law of the Sea and the 
Agreement of 28 July 1994 relating to the implementation of Part XI thereof [1998] O.J L 179. 
124 Article 212(1) UNCLOS. 
125 Ibidem, Part II Section 3. 
126 Ibidem, article 227. 
127 Ibidem, article 218 (and for atmospheric emissions, art. 222). 
128Ibidem, article 26. 
129 Case 308/06,  cit. note 103, para 64. 
130 See, for example, Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice [1998] I-03603; Case 
C-431/05 Merck Genéricos Productos Farmacéuticos [2007] I-07001. 
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This would be done before a national court, applying its own principles and rules of 
interpretation, which could differ from those of CJEU as regards UNCLOS. However, it 
seems that the EU is at least partially competent to regulate emissions from ships, and 
the declaration of invalidity of a EU measure in relation to this particular section of 
UNCLOS needs the exclusive competence of the CJEU,131 because otherwise the 
principle of uniformity of EU law could be threatened. 
 
3. Analysis of the legality of the EU measure 
As with previous agreements, the material provisions of the Convention will be 
analysed in order to assess whether EU regulations on carbon emissions from ships will 
conflict with UNCLOS, since the EU could face dispute settlement proceedings at the 
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea in the unlikely event that it agreed to its 
jurisdiction.132 
It is to be noted that when the UNCLOS was negotiated,133 even though a chapter on the 
marine environment was included, the parties were probably not thinking of carbon 
emissions leading to climate change,134,but rather of gases and liquids delivered by 
ships that could damage the seas. By adopting a broad definition of “pollution”, some 
UNCLOS articles could now be used as a basis for the regulation of carbon 
emissions.135 In any case, they would not prevent the EU from acting, but reinforce its 
arguments, since when it comes to pollution into the atmosphere, unlike pollution from 
ships,136 there is no express obligation to act within the framework of international 
cooperation.137 Therefore, the problems that EU legislation might face in the light of 
UNCLOS are not of competence, but of content. 
The main limit established by UNCLOS is the right to innocent passage, according to 
which ships are entitled to traverse “that sea without entering internal waters or calling 
                                                
131 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] 04199. 
132 Article 186 UNCLOS, as it happened with the so-called “Swordfish case” between the EU and Chile. 
133 The conference took place between 1973 and 1982. 
134 DOELLE, M., “Climate change and the use of the dispute settlement regime of the law of the sea 
Convention”, Dalhousie University, (2005), p. 7. 
135 For example, articles 194 and 212(1) UNCLOS. 
136 Ibidem, article 211(1). 
137 Ibidem, article 212(1). 
RCDA Vol. III Núm. 2 (2012) The inclusion of shipping in the EU Emission Trading Scheme… 
27 
at a road stead or port facility outside internal waters”138 and proceed “to or from 
internal waters or a call at such road stead or port facility.”139 Such a passage is only 
innocent “so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the 
coastal State.”140 It is highly unlikely that the environment could be included in one of 
these categories.  
An EU ETS would not infringe such provisions because as long as ships are not 
sanctioned, they will be free to navigate through the exclusive economic zone and the 
territorial sea of the EU. Only when they call at a port would they be put under the EU 
carbon emissions legislation.  
Secondly, as a consequence of the right to innocent passage, “no charge may be levied 
upon foreign ships by reason only of their passage through the territorial sea.”141 It is 
submitted that charges would only be levied for calling at a port, not just for passing by. 
Thirdly, UNCLOS provides for non-discrimination of foreign vessels.142 In regulations 
such as the one proposed, the same treatment will have to be given to all ships, 
regardless to their nationality. This is not likely to constitute a problem. 
In conclusion, an EU regulation of emissions from ships will not, in principle, be in 
breach of the UNCLOS. 
 
VI. World Trade Organization (WTO) 
1. International commitments 
The EU, as a signatory to the WTO Treaties, has committed itself to a series of 
obligations to liberalize world trade, both in goods and services, which are relevant for 
the purposes of this article.  
The inclusion of shipping under the EU ETS may fall under the WTO provisions in two 
different ways. First, it can constitute a potential obstacle to the free trade of goods 
                                                
138 Ibidem, article 18(1)(a) in relation to article 26. 
139 Ibidem, article 18(1)(b). 
140 Ibidem, article 19. 
141 Ibidem, article 21(1). 
142 Ibidem, article 227. 
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(General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs, GATT) and second, shipping can fall under 
the provisions that regulate services (General Agreement on Trade of Services, GATS).  
 
2. Enforcement 
The EU has succeeded Member States on their obligations under GATT143 and it is 
itself a party to the World Trade Organization, but the Court of Justice has considered 
that neither GATT144 nor WTO agreements145 have direct effect per se.146 
 
3. Analysis of the legality of the EU measure 
3.1 GATT 
As far as GATT is concerned, it could be argued that shipping is not an ordinary 
service, but one which plays a key role in international trade of goods.147 Therefore, 
GATT would apply to all those ships carrying goods, but not to passenger ships. If 
GATT were to be triggered, it would still have to be demonstrated that it violates some 
of its provisions, mainly articles III, V and XI. 
 
 
 
                                                
143 Joint cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Company, cit. note 102, para 15. 
144 Ibidem, para 27. 
145 C- 149/96, Portugal v. Council, cit. note 29, para 47. For a favourable opinion of the Court’s 
judgement, see EECKHOUT, P., “Judicial enforcement of WTO Law in the EU”, Journal of 
International Economic Law, (2002). For a dissenting one, see GRILLER, S., “Judicial enforceability of 
WTO Law in the EU”, Journal of International Economic Law, 2000. 
146 They can only have direct effect in two situations: first, “where the Community measures refer 
expressly to the provisions of the WTO Agreement” (Case 70/87 Fediol v. Commission [1989] ECR 
1781) and “where the [EU] intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the 
WTO” (C-69/89 Nakajima v. Council [1991] ECR I-2069) c.f. KUIJPER, P.J., & BRONCKERS, M., 
“WTO Law in the European Court of Justice” Common Market Law Review, 2005, p. 1313. 
147 According to the International Chamber of Shipping, shipping accounts for 90% of world trade of 
goods (see <http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/worldtrade/>). The latest available data show that 7.9 
billion tons of cargo were transported by sea in 2010, of which 3.4 billion tons was dry bulk, 3.1 liquid 
bulk and 1.4 “non-bulk”, mainly containers. (IHS FAIRPLAY, Ships visiting European Ports, 2011, 
Sweden, p.6 ) As for Europe, 70% of foreign trade (50% in terms of value) and 40% of European 
domestic trade (short-sea shipping) is made by ship (Commission Communication on strategic goals and 
recommendations for the EU’s maritime transport policy until 2018, COM (2009) 8, 21.1.09, p.2). 
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A. Article III:2: fiscal measures 
The inclusion of shipping in the EU ETS could constitute a violation of the national 
treatment principle provided for in article III of GATT. It would amount to an internal 
measure, insofar as it applies equally to EU and non-EU ships.148  
The first thing to be determined is whether the EU ETS constitutes a fiscal or non fiscal 
measure, so article III.2 or III.4 applies.  
In order for this to be done, the concept of Border Tax Adjustments must be considered. 
The Working Party on BTA,149 which was established to clarify the taxes falling under 
article III.2, concluded that this provision covers taxes on products150 (the so-called 
indirect taxes), but not direct taxes. As regards in-between taxes (so-called taxes 
occultes), a “divergence of views” was noted.151 The Working Party restricted itself to 
referring to the OECD definition of taxes occultes: “consumption taxes on capital 
equipment, auxiliary materials and services used in the transportation and production of 
other taxable goods.”152 Since there is no clear definition of taxes, other elements need 
to be observed. 
Although they are not conclusive, several reasons can be used to argue that the EU ETS 
does not constitute a fiscal measure, either with respect to carbon emissions or to fuel 
consumption. First of all, the procedure used to approve the EU ETS Directive and its 
reforms was article 192(1), not article 192(2), which refers to “provisions primarily of 
fiscal nature”.153 Secondly, as Advocate General Kokott held in relation to taxes under 
the Chicago Convention, the EU ETS does not have the usual characteristics of a tax: 
“Taxes are levied as consideration for a public service used. The amount is set 
unilaterally by a public body and can be determined in advance. (...) An 
emissions trading scheme such as the EU scheme, however, is a market-based 
measure. No provision is made for fees or charges for the acquisition of emission 
allowances. (…) If emission allowances are subsequently traded in the market 
                                                
148 BIRNIE, P., et al, International Law & the Environment, OUP, 2009, p. 798. 
149 Report of the Working Party adopted on 2 December 1970 (L/3464). 
150 VAN CALSTER, G., International & EU Trade law, Cameron May, 2001, p.419. 
151 BIRNE, International Law..., cit. note 148, p.801. 
152 Report of the Working Party, cit. note 149, para 15. 
153 Article 192(2)(a) TFEU (ex. Art. 175(2)(a) TEC). 
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after their allocation by the competent authorities, the price will in that case also 
be governed by supply and demand and is not fixed in advance.”154 
Thirdly, the allowances bought are not comparable to a tax, insofar as they can also be 
sold in the event that they are not needed by the polluting company.155 
Fourthly, according to BIRNIE et al, an emissions charge can be classified as “taxes on 
resource use”, which: 
“are not on products as such, even though they are incurred in connection with 
the manufacture of products. The GATT would classify these charges as direct 
taxes paid out of gross revenues not eligible for BTA.”156 
In fact, the inclusion of shipping in the EU ETS would regulate the consequences 
(emissions) of the use of certain sources of energy (fossil fuels) caused by a particular 
means of transport (shipping) which plays a major role in the trade of goods. As a 
result, an empty ship or a ship carrying persons would fall under the same regime as if it 
carried goods to be sold. Even if it is beyond doubt that it has an impact on goods, the 
links are not strong enough to qualify this system as a tax on products. Therefore, article 
III.2 does not apply. 
Once it has been determined that the EU ETS is a non-fiscal measure, several 
possibilities arise. It can either be an internal measure (article III:4), a measure 
concerning goods in transit (article V) or a measure affecting imports (article XI). 
 
B. Article III:4: non fiscal internal measures 
Since the EU ETS has an effect on shipping transport, which is an important means of 
trading goods, article III:4 could apply, because the EU ETS is an internal measure 
which applies both to foreign and domestic products. To determine whether such an 
article has been contravened, discrimination needs to be appreciated.  
As far as discrimination is concerned, article III:4 covers both direct and indirect 
discrimination.157 Given that the EU regulation is worded with no distinction on 
nationality, direct discrimination is excluded.  
                                                
154 AG Kokott Opinion in C-366/10, cit. note 34, paras 214-215. For a similar reasoning by the Court of 
Justice, see Case C-366/10,  cit. note 3, paras 141-145. 
155 BARTELS, “The Inclusion…”, cit. note 5, p. 9. 
156 BIRNIE, International Law..., cit. note 148, p. 800. 
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As far as indirect discrimination is concerned158 the solution is not so straightforward. It 
is to be noted that the purpose of the regulation is irrelevant,159 the only question 
remaining is its “protective effect”.160 Following this line of reasoning, environmental 
concerns such as the polluter pays principle are not prohibited,161 but they cannot be 
used to avoid compliance with article III:4. It has been rightly noted that this conception 
is more restrictive than the one adopted by the CJEU as regards indirect 
discrimination.162  
Since the EU ETS is a measure that is not clear from either the point of view of 
international trade or its link with the product, particular difficulties are to be 
experienced when looking for a comparison. Two different tests can be done, depending 
on the relation between the products that are being compared. If “alike”, an individual 
discrimination test can be carried out. If “substitutable or directly competitive”, the 
cumulative consequences of the measure are assessed.163 
If two specific products are compared in a case-by-case analysis, it might be found that 
the EU system amounts to indirect discrimination against foreign goods, since it is more 
likely that a Chinese product will in fact have to suffer a disadvantage from a regulation 
which has a greater effect on products that are manufactured a long way from the EU. 
On the contrary, if the measure is analysed in general, there is no such protection to 
domestic goods. First, European goods, either travelling inside a European country, 
from one European country to another or from Europe to another country outside, will 
always be transported by a ship falling under the EU regulation, whereas foreign goods 
will only be caught when entering the EU. Therefore, the system will, if anything, 
constitute indirect reverse discrimination against goods produced in Europe. Secondly, 
                                                                                                                                          
157 See, for example, United States – Measures affecting alcoholic Malt Beverages, Report of the Panel, 
12 June 1992, DS23/R - 39S/206. 
158 Also referred to as “de facto discrimination”. 
159 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, 4 October 1996, AB-1996-2. 
160 MATSUSHITA, M. et al, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy, Oxford 
University Press, 2006, p. 254. 
161 United States – Taxes on Petroleum and certain imported substances, Report of the Panel, 17 June 
1987 (L/6175 - 34S/136), para 5.2.5. 
162 HUDEC, R.E., “GATT/WTO Constraints on national regulation: requiem for an aims and effects test”, 
32 International Law Journal, 1998, p..633. 
163 Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages AB-1999-6 para .9; see also, WIERS, J., Trade and 
Environment in the EC and WTO, 2002, p. 159. 
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there is no necessary link between the headquarters of a company and the origin of the 
goods that are transported, so even if this measure applied only to European shipping 
companies or to emissions delivered only in European Seas, foreign goods would fall 
under the regulation when transported by European ships. Thirdly, although the further 
away a product is manufactured, the more likely it is that the ships transporting it will 
deliver more carbon emissions, the decisive criterion is not distance but the emissions 
released. A solar boat entering the port of Rotterdam from China will have to buy fewer 
allowances than a coal-powered ship sailing up the Rhine River from Düsseldorf. 
Fourthly, ships from countries like Albania or Morocco might be more favoured than 
those from Union territories such as the Canary Islands. Fifthly, Chinese goods to be 
sold in Europe and European goods to be sold in China will have to pay the same 
charge, given that they pollute the same. 
In conclusion, the system as a whole cannot be deemed to discriminate in favour of 
European goods. 
 
C. Article V: goods in transit 
Another provision that is relevant to WTO law is article V GATT, which regulates the 
right of transit of goods and vessels carrying such goods. Once again, this provision 
does not apply to passenger ships. Article V.1 reads as follows:  
“Goods (including baggage), and also vessels and other means of transport, shall be 
deemed to be in transit across the territory of a contracting party when the passage 
across such territory, with or without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or 
change in the mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey beginning 
and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party across whose territory 
the traffic passes. Traffic of this nature is termed in this article «traffic in transit».” 
It is to be noted that this article refers to “contracting parties” and not to “countries”. As 
a result, the EU territory must be regarded as a whole for the purposes of article V. This 
is the most sensible interpretation, because goods manufactured or marketed within the 
Union can travel freely across its whole territory,164 as if it were a single country. For 
these purposes, Brazilian goods arriving at the Port of Vigo and which are to be sold in 
                                                
164 Article 34 TFEU; see also Case 120/78 Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] 
ECR 649, para 14. 
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Paris cannot be deemed to be “in transit” between Vigo and Paris. The only chance the 
EU has to tax these products is when they first reach EU territory. If, on the other hand, 
the goods were to be sold in Andorra, Article V would be triggered.  
It has been argued165 that Article V only applies to ships in transit, not to port calls. 
Thus, if the EU measure were to be triggered by calls at European ports, article V would 
be irrelevant. However, this might not be the correct interpretation of article V. The 
most common case is that the final destination of the goods is not the country of the port 
itself, but somewhere else in the continent. The port is just an intermediate stop, and this 
is why Article V includes “trans-shipment”,166 that is to say, the unloading of the cargo 
at the port and the continuation of transportation by road or rail transport. In fact, one of 
the cases in which Article V was invoked (although solved before reaching the panel), 
was when the EC tried to annul a provision of the United States’ Cuban Democracy Act 
of 1992 which denied EC vessels transit through US ports.167 The same occurred when 
Chile prohibited168 unloading swordfish at Chilean ports.169  Furthermore, the main 
supporters of article V were landlocked parties.170 Therefore, it is submitted that article 
V applies to port calls. 
For the limited number of situations in which article V applies, (goods entering EU 
ports to be sold outside the EU) the 2nd paragraph lays down the criteria that need to be 
respected. It shall be noted that these criteria apply only to “the routes most convenient 
for international transit”.171  In such cases, the parties must respect the following:  
“No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the place of 
origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to 
the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport.”172 
 
                                                
165 Client Earth, Legal implications…,  cit. note 54, p. 39. 
166 According to the Oxford Dictionary, trans-shipment means: “transfer (cargo) from one ship or other 
form of transport to another”, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
167 Note of the WTO Secretariat “Article V of the GATT 1994, scope and application” WTO, G/C/W/408, 
p.7 in relation to case WT/DS38/2, 8 October 1996. 
168 Article 165 of the Chilean Ley General de Pesca y Acuicultura. Case WT/DS193/2, 7 November 2000. 
169 Note of the Secretariat, “Article V...”, cit. note 167, p.7. 
170 R.BHALA, Modern GATT law, 2005, Thomson, p. 471. 
171 Article V(2) GATT. 
172 Ibidem. 
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Unfortunately, no case law has yet been decided in application of article V of GATT.173 
Similarly to what was the case under article III —although the emissions will be closely 
related to the place of departure, since the longer the distance to navigate, the most 
likely emissions would be higher— it should be accepted that the emissions criterion is 
different from the place of origin criterion.  
In any event, it remains to be seen how the EU ETS will be triggered for ships. It is still 
unclear whether ships that are merely making technical calls will be included, and how 
much of the freight a vessel must unload in order to fall under the ETS. If it were 
required to unload all of it, it is very likely that ships would leave the majority of its 
freight at a European port and the rest at a nearby non-EU port. 
 
D. Article XI: Elimination of quantitative restrictions to imports 
Article XI:1 prohibits  non-fiscal measures which constitute quantitative restrictions and 
have a discriminatory effect on imports or exports. The EU ETS could fall under the 
category of “other measures”, which has been interpreted very broadly by the WTO 
panels.174 According to Lorand BARTELS, what is important here is the “restrictive 
effect, no matter how small”.175 He considers that including aviation in the EU ETS 
constitutes a measure equivalent to a quantitative restriction. It is assumed that Mr. 
BARTELS refers only to the few flights that carry goods and excludes all the flights 
carrying passengers. 
If article XI were to be applicable, including ships in the EU ETS would undoubtedly 
have an effect on trade, albeit indirect or potential, so article XI:1 would be violated. 
The main defence for the European scheme in relation to this article lies one stage 
before, in the issue of whether article XI can be applied at all. It is submitted that the 
EU ETS is a measure which applies both to domestic and foreign products, not to 
imports, so article XI cannot be triggered. As Rosa FERNANDEZ EGEA has defended, 
                                                
173 Note of the Secretariat, “Article V...”, cit. note 167, p. 7. 
174 See, for example, BARTELS, “The Inclusion…”, cit. note 5, p.9; FERNANDEZ EGEA, R., Comercio 
de mercancías y protección del medio ambiente, Marcial Pons, 2008, p. 58. 
175 BARTELS, “The Inclusion…”, cit. note 5, p. 10. 
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on the basis of the Interpretative Note for article III, it seems that when the measure is 
applicable to foreign and domestic products, article III:4 prevails over article XI.176 
 
E. Article XX: justifications 
In the unlikely event that the measure were to be found contrary to articles III, V or XI 
of GATT, the measure might still be justified under article XX, paragraphs (b) and/or 
(g).  
Article XX(b) provides for an exception to GATT when a measure is “necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health”, as long as some requirements, such as 
transparency and non-arbitrary discrimination, are fulfilled. Taking into account that the 
effects of greenhouse gases and climate change could in the future pose a risk to animal, 
plant and human life, article XX(b) may apply. In favour of such an argument, the 
judgment in Brazil – Retreated Tyres, needs to be mentioned. In this case, the Appellate 
Body held that the contribution to the protection of life and health does not need to be 
immediate. When a country intends to fight global warming, the effectiveness of the 
measure can only be assessed in the long term.177 Therefore, an emission trading system 
enacted to fight climate change may well fall under article XX(b). 
In any event, it would be more difficult to rely on article XX(b), since the EU ETS is 
not only intended to protect humans, animals or plants but, more generally, to protect 
the planet.  
As a result, it seems that article XX(g) constitutes a much clearer legal basis for 
defending measures concerning the fight against climate change.178 It states that a 
measure can be justified when it aims to conserve “exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.” The concept of natural resources has been broadly construed so that it 
even includes “clean air”.179 According to MATSHUSHITA et al, “under this expansive 
interpretation, virtually any living or non-living resources, particularly those addressed 
                                                
176 FERNÁNDEZ EGEA, Comercio de mercancías…, cit. note 174, p.64 
177 Brazil – Retreated Tyres, 3 December 2007, WT/DS332/AB/R, para 151. 
178 See, for example, FERNANDEZ EGEA, Comercio de mercancías…, cit. note 174, p.142. 
179 United States -Standards for reformulated and conventional gasoline, 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, 
p. 19. 
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by multilateral environmental agreements, would qualify.”180 Moreover, the Appellate 
Body said in US-Shrimps that “Article XX(g) is not "static" in its content or reference 
but rather, by definition “evolutionary”.181 In view of all the above, this author agrees 
with the position of the scholars who have argued that the atmosphere should also be 
regarded as a “natural resource” for the purposes of article XX(g).182 
An emission trading scheme is one of the most flexible proportionality test policy 
options under WTO law, since it introduces market mechanisms that allow companies 
to buy their allowances when they choose. It enables the appropriate balance to be 
achieved between fighting climate change and not being too restrictive to economic 
activity.183 As a result, the inclusion of shipping in the EU ETS could, in principle, be 
justified under article XX (b) or (g). 
 
3.2. GATS 
As is the case with aviation,184 shipping is regulated by a specific Annex to GATS,185 
since no agreement was reached by the parties either at the Uruguay186 or the Doha187 
Negotiating Rounds.  As a result, the Most Favoured Nation Principle in GATS does 
not apply to maritime transport.188  
                                                
180 MATSUSHITA, The World Trade..., cit. note 160, p.797. 
181 US-Import prohibition of certain shrimp products, 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, para 130. 
182 See, for example, GREEN, A., “Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How Constraining 
are Trade Rules?”, 2005, 8 Journal of International Economic Law 143, p. 183; CONDON, B.J., 
Environmental Sovereignty and the WTO: Trade Sanctions and International Law, Hotei, 2006, p. 11; 
PAUWELYN, “US Federal Climate Policy and competitiveness. Concerns: The Limits and Options of 
International Trade Law”, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, University of Duke, 
Working Paper, 2007, p.35; HOWSE, R., & ELIASON, A., “Domestic and international Strategies to 
address climate change: an overview of the WTO legal issues”, in COTTIER, T., et al (eds), International 
Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 
p.61; TRAN, C., “Using GATT, Art XX to justify climate change measures in claims under the WTO 
Agreements”, 2010, Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol.27, p.351; MELTZER, “Climate 
Change…”, cit. note 5, pp.141-142; BARTELS, “The Inclusion...”, cit. note 5, p. 15. 
183 See, for example, ZAPFEL, P., “Greenhouse gas emissions trading in the EU: building the world’s 
largest cap-and-trade system”, Chapter 11, in HANS JÜRGENS, B. (ed), Emissions Trading for Climate 
Policy: US and European perspectives, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. 
184  Annex XXXVI to GATS. 
185  Annex on Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services to GATS. 
186 WTO – Trade in Services, Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008, p. 668. 
187  Ibidem, p.679. 
188  Article I, cit. note 185. 
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Throughout later negotiations, a Ministerial Decision on Negotiations on Maritime 
Transport Services was adopted,189 which in para 7 provides for a standstill clause by 
which: 
“no participant shall apply for the period of the extended post-Uruguay Round 
Negotiations any measure affecting trade in services in such a manner as would 
improve its negotiating positions and leverage.”190  
The Negotiating group on Maritime Transport Services is in charge of enforcing such a 
clause.191 In the present case, by including ships in the EU ETS, the EU is not acting to 
improve its negotiating position, since the measure is a medium-term one192 that has by 
no means been adopted only to be abolished soon. 
Moreover, the exceptions in Article XIV GATS act in the same way as Article XX in 
GATT, but this time only one of the relevant grounds is to be found: the necessity “to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health.”193 To date, there is no case law on this 
article, but the case law on article XX(b) GATT might be useful.194 
In conclusion, it is improbable that GATS could provide a basis for challenging the EU 
ETS applied to emissions from ships. 
 
VII. PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER MARITIME AREAS 
1. International commitments 
The principle of sovereignty over maritime seas means that the EU, as a body exercising 
the competences of its Member States, shall respect the sovereignty of other non 
Member States over their maritime areas. As a consequence, the EU has to limit the 
scope of its legislation concerning maritime areas to its sovereign space. If there is no 
link between the EU regulation and the territory to be regulated, the EU would violate 
this principle. 
                                                
189 Negotiating group on Maritime Transport Services, note by the Secretariat, 2 May 1994, 
TS/NGMTS/W/1. 
190 Max Planck Commentaries, “WTO – Trade...”, cit. note 186, p. 675. 
191 Note by the Secretariat, cit. note 189, para 8. 
192 Phase III of the EU ETS will end by 2020 and the system is expected to continue afterwards. 
193 Article XIV(b) GATS, the wording of which reads the same as that of Article XX (b) GATT. 
194 VAAN DEN BOSSCHE, P., The law and policy of the World Trade Organization, 2008, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 661. 
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2. Enforcement 
The EU is not only bound by the international treaties it ratifies, but also by the 
principles of international customary law.195 However, such principles can only be 
invoked by individuals if: (1) they are “capable of calling into question the competence 
of the EU to adopt that act”196; and (2) they are “liable to affect rights which the 
individual derives from EU law or to create obligations under EU law in his regard.”197  
Having set these two conditions for invoking such principles, the second of which, 
according to AG Kokott, is rarely going to be met,198 the Court of Justice restricts the 
impact of customary principles, by adding that: 
“since a principle of customary international law does not have the same degree 
of precision as a provision of an international agreement, judicial review must 
necessarily be limited to the question whether, in adopting the act in question, the 
institutions of the European Union made manifest errors of assessment 
concerning the conditions for applying those principles.”199 
This restrictive line of reasoning renders a challenge to the EU ETS under the principle 
of sovereignty of the maritime areas, but it is very unlikely to be of any consequence. 
 
3. Analysis of the legality of the EU ETS 
Although it is a purely theoretical problem, it may be interesting to briefly analyse the 
extent to which including shipping under the EU ETS conforms to the sovereignty 
principle. 
                                                
195 Article 3(5) TEU. See also Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019, paras 9 
and 10; C-162/96 Racke cit. note 36, paras 45 and 46; C-366/10 ATAA, cit. note 3, para 101. 
196 Case C-366/10 ATAA, cit. note 3, para 107; see also Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 
117/85 and 125/85 to 129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 5193, 
paragraphs 14 to 18, and Case C-405/92 Mondiet [1993] ECR I-6133, paragraphs 11 to 16. 
197 Case C-366/10 ATAA cit. note 3, para 107. 
198 AG Kokott Opinion on ATAA case, cit. note 34, whose para 134 reads as follows: “Even though 
every principle of customary international law to which the European Union is committed is binding on it 
under international law, the nature and broad logic of a particular principle might be such that it cannot 
(or can only to a limited extent) be relied upon within the European Union for the purposes of judicial 
review of the validity of acts of EU institutions,  especially in proceedings brought by natural or legal 
persons”. 
199 Case C-366/10, cit. note 3, para 110. 
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The principle of State sovereignty applies to land, air space and certain areas of the sea. 
As far as the sea is concerned, this principle is recognised and developed by 
UNCLOS,200 where it can be seen that sovereignty is not absolute and that it is 
regulated differently by States because they all have different competences.201 Unlike 
land, which is all part of State sovereignty, most of the sea remains non-sovereign 
territory,202 where jurisdiction is exercised by the flag country.203 
The main question as regards the principle of sovereignty is: can a country (or a 
regional integration organisation) regulate carbon emissions that are caused outside its 
seas? Before addressing this problem it might also be relevant to acknowledge that if no 
country can unilaterally regulate emissions caused on the High Seas, and no 
international agreement is reached, how can the emissions reduction objectives of the 
Kyoto Protocol be met? 
In order to assess the principle of territoriality, a difference must be drawn between 
three kinds of States: coastal States,204 close to which ships pass by; port States,205 
where ships stop; and flag States,206 under which the ships are registered. It is expected 
that the inclusion of shipping in the EU ETS will be enforced by port States.  
The most sovereignty-compliant way of regulating emissions would be to include in the 
EU ETS all the ships carrying a flag of one of the Member States of the Union. 
However, if such a regulation were to be enacted, it is likely that many more ships 
would re-flag under a country outside the ETS. As a result, there would be two 
alternatives for enforcement: the coastal or the port State. For legal and operational 
reasons, port calls are a much better option for triggering the EU ETS, as is the case 
with airlines and airport stops.207 
                                                
200 See Recital 4 of the Preamble of UNCLOS. 
201 These areas are: internal waters, ports, territorial sea, archipelagic waters, contiguous zone, straits, 
exclusive economic zone, continental shelf and high seas. 
202 Article 89 UNCLOS. 
203 Ibidem, article 94. 
204 Ibidem, article 220. 
205 Ibidem, article 218. 
206 Ibidem, article 217. 
207 A foreign carrier will have to buy allowances “in the Member State with the greatest attributed 
aviation emissions from flights performed by that operator in the base year” Article 18a(1)(b) of Directive 
2003/87/EC, cit. note 47. 
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Once it has been determined that the ETS will be triggered by port calls, the following 
should be borne in mind.  
Firstly, vessels call at European ports voluntarily, and if they do not call at a European 
port, no matter how close they get to the coast, they will not fall under the ETS.  
Secondly, the UNCLOS sets a limit on state sovereignty: the EU system cannot regulate 
“construction, design, equipment or manning” (the so-called “CDEM standards”)208 
unless it does so to give effect to “generally accepted international rules or 
standards,”209 as it is the case with IMO efficiency standards. However, the EU ETS 
does not regulate the way in which ships reduce carbon emissions, only the objective 
fact that emissions are released.  
Thirdly, regulations with extraterritorial effect have been adopted before in the field of 
transport, one early example being the Catalan-promoted Llibre del Consolat del Mar, 
dating back to the 14th century. This is now the case, as a recent report shows,210 of the 
scheme that requires ships in EU ports to report on cargoes, no matter where they come 
from,211 or of “the regime for maximum sulphur content in fuel for passenger ships in 
regular traffic to or from an EU port” which includes third country vessels.212 The same 
can be said of the 1990 Convention implementing Schengen, which requires carriers to 
“take all necessary measures (out of the EU territory) to ensure that an alien carrier by 
air or sea is in possession of the travel documents required for the entry into the 
territories of the Contracting Parties.”213 This is also the case of “the tax paid in France 
on airplane tickets, whose amount is higher for flights going out of the European 
Union”214 or of the port differentiated dues that are in force in some countries or 
ports.215 Moreover, the State of California’s higher sulphur standards applying to all 
                                                
208 Article 21.1 UNCLOS. 
209 Ibidem. 
210 Client Earth, Legal implications…, cit. note 54, p. 20. 
211 Directive 2002/59/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2002 establishing a 
Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system [2002] OJ. L 208. 
212 Directive 2005/33 of the EP and the Council, 6 July 2005, amending Directive 1999/32, [2005]O.J. L 
191/59. 
213  MAYER, “A defense of...”, 2011, cit. note 5, p. 10. 
214  Ibidem 
215 See, for example, the Environmental Ship Index, created by the World Ports Climate Initiative and 
which entered into force on 1 January 2011. It ranked ships on a scale from zero to one hundred 
according to the emissions they released. The idea is to grant reductions in port dues to ships voluntarily 
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vessels were deemed to be valid by a Californian Court.216 According to the above 
mentioned report: 
“The case was dismissed on the basis that though the rules amount to an 
expansive and even possibly unprecedented state regulatory scheme, the (…) 
Court found that California has a right to mitigate its environmental problems, 
which “are themselves unusual and even unprecedented” and that California had 
“clear justification” for the rules so that general maritime law could not be used 
to ban a state from exercising its own power to combat severe problems.”217 
In addition, the Second IMO GHG Study states: 
“When an IMO instrument has entered into force, countries that have ratified the 
instrument can apply it not only to ships of their own flag but to all ships, 
regardless of flag. Therefore, ships wanting to enter the ports or waters under the 
jurisdiction of a county that has ratified an IMO instrument will have to abide by 
that convention, regardless of flag. This is an important principle, commonly 
referred to as the principle of “no more favourable treatment”. It refers to port 
States enforcing applicable standards in a uniform manner to all ships in their 
ports, regardless of flag.”218 
It could be argued that IMO is a global organisation and, therefore, that the principle is 
not applicable to regional organisations. However, what this principle entails is that 
ships coming from a country which has not signed the IMO Treaties would also be 
submitted to the regulation, because it is the same case as in the EU with non-EU ships.  
Fourthly, the principle of territoriality should be balanced with other international 
principles, such as the “polluter pays” principle. There are two ways of enforcing this 
principle: either internationally or unilaterally. The first option has been strongly sought 
                                                                                                                                          
submitting to that program and being graded above a certain number. So far, of the 1,439 ships that were 
ESI rated, only sixteen scored above 50. In total, nineteen ports had joined the ESI up to November 2012, 
including some major European ports, such as Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg, Amsterdam or Rome, and 
important non-EU ports, like Los Angeles, New York, Oslo or Melbourne. Although it is true that this 
system is a non-compulsory one, it alters the competition rules, conferring advantages to cleaner ships. 
Going beyond ESI, countries like Sweden have enacted a national-wide differentiated dues system, which 
takes into account two portions: vessel gross tonnage and the amount of cargo loaded and unloaded. The 
former is at the same time differentiated in relation to sulphur and nitrous oxide emissions.   
216 Pacific Merchant Association v. Goldstene, 2011, US App. LEXIS 6239 (9th Cir. Mar.28,2011). 
217 Client Earth, Legal implications…, cit. note 54, p 26. 
218 IMO, “Second GHG…”, cit. note 7, para 2.32, p. 20. 
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by the Union but no agreement was reached. Therefore, the only available means is 
regional action.  
Fifthly, there is a sufficient link between the fact regulated and the regulator, which is 
the entry of foreign ships to EU ports. 
Sixthly, the EU regime provides for an exemption to the ETS for airlines (and probably 
for shipping companies in the future) whose countries have the same regulations on 
emissions.219 Although there is no obligation to avoid double taxation, it shows how the 
only objective of the EU is to protect the environment, not trade. 
In conclusion, there are several elements that suggest that the principle of sovereignty 
would not be violated by including shipping in the EU ETS. 
 
VIII. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
In parallel to the multilateral commitments that the EU has acquired, the Union has also 
ratified bilateral agreements on shipping transport which may clash with the application 
of the EU ETS to shipping. 
 
1. EC-China Agreement on Maritime Transport  
The only220 specific Maritime Transport Agreement that the EU has so far concluded 
was signed with China221 in 2002, and entered into force in March 2008.222 It provides 
for the principle of non-discrimination to the other party’s vessels223 and obliges the 
parties to abstain from adopting legislative or technical measures which could have the 
effect of discriminating against the other party.224 Moreover, the Agreement imposes a 
                                                
219 Article 25a(1) of Directive EC, cit. note 47. 
220 A similar agreement is being negotiated with India (see EUROPEAN COMMISSION web page: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/international/bilateral_cooperation/india_en.htm>) 
221 Agreement on maritime transport between the European Community and its Member States, of the one 
part, and the government of the People’s Republic of China, 06 December 2002. 
222 Council Decision 2008/143/EC of 28 January 2008 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement on 
maritime transport between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China, of the other [2008] O.J. L46/25. 
223 Ibidem, article 4(1). 
224 Ibidem, article 4(3)(c). 
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duty of cooperation in several areas,225 one of which is marine pollution226 (although no 
reference is made to emissions from ships). In conclusion, no additional obligations are 
created for the EU by this bilateral treaty compared to WTO law. 
The important difference could be enforcement, since WTO law is not directly effective 
before the CJEU. However, the EC-China agreement is only to be enforced “through 
diplomatic channels.”227 In addition, this agreement is only valid for 5 years (until 
March 2013228) and it can be denounced by the EU with 6 months advance notice.229 All 
these factors prevent the Agreement from becoming a criterion for the validity of EU 
law. 
 
2. Other agreements 
The EU has concluded several general agreements containing specific provisions on 
free trade and shipping. This is the case of the Association Agreements with Algeria,230 
Chile,231 and Jordan,232 and of the EC-Bangladesh Cooperation Agreement,233 the 
Economic Partnership Agreement EU-CARIFORUM,234 the EU Korea Free Trade 
Agreement,235 the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement236 and the Trade, 
Development and Cooperation Agreement EC-South Africa.237  
                                                
225 Ibidem, article 10. 
226 Ibidem, article 10(4). 
227 Ibidem, article 11(2). 
228 The EU ETS is unlikely to be applied to ships before that date. 
229 Article 12, cit. note 222. 
230 Article 34(4)(b) of the Euro Mediterranean Agreement, 10 October 2005, establishing an Association 
between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Algeria, of the other part. O.J. L265/2. 
231 Article 108(1)(c) of the Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and 
its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, of 30 December 2002 
[2002] OJ L 352/3. 
232 Article 39(2)(b) of the Euro Mediterranean Agreement, 15 May 2002, establishing an Association 
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part [2002] O.J. L 129/3. 
233 Article 4(7) of the Cooperation Agreement, 21 May 1999, between the European Community and the 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh on partnership and development [1999] O.J. L 118/48. 
234 Article 109(4)(b) of the Economic Partnership Agreement, 30 October 2010, between the 
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part [2010] O.J. 289/I/3. 
235 Article 7.47(4)(b) of the Free Trade Agreement, 14 May 2011, between the European Union and its 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part [2011] O.J. L 127/6. 
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Although these agreements contain similar provisions to WTO law, their relevance is 
based on the fact that they are directly effective,238 entailing that if they were invoked 
through a preliminary ruling,239 the CJEU would have to examine the material problems 
and the issue of discrimination. Nevertheless, as has been stated throughout this article 
and for the above mentioned reasons, the EU ETS is not a discriminatory measure, but 
one which applies equally to domestic and foreign vessels and therefore the non-
discrimination clauses of the bilateral treaties are not breached. 
 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
In the field of maritime transport, the European Union could (and perhaps should) keep 
on sailing through the rough sea of emission trading of international transport that it 
initiated when it included emissions from international commercial flights in the EU 
ETS. Although politically disputed, this article has tried to demonstrate that legal 
challenges to the EU ETS are unlikely to succeed for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the enforcement of international provisions is extremely difficult. The European 
Court of Justice has proved itself to be very restrictive when it comes to analysing the 
legality of an EU measure in the light of international public law. Moreover, the lack of 
efficient international mechanisms for solving international disputes (UNCLOS, Kyoto 
Protocol, UNFCCC, MARPOL) or the impossibility of reaching international 
agreements on material provisions (shipping regulation in WTO) mean that a legal 
international solution is highly improbable. 
Secondly, even if the problem of enforcement can be overcome, the inclusion of 
shipping emissions in the EU ETS does not clash with any of the international 
agreements the EU has ratified. The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol are not only 
                                                                                                                                          
236 Article 39(1)(c) of the  Agreement on partnership and cooperation, 28 November 1997, establishing a 
partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian 
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respected by the EU measure, they are reinforced by such determined compliance with 
the reduction objectives the EU has committed to. The MARPOL Convention only sets 
minimum standards and UNCLOS does not prohibit – in fact it even encourages – the 
regulation of emissions by ships. Furthermore, GATS does not apply to shipping 
transport yet. 
The three most problematic international provisions are GATT, bilateral agreements 
with no discrimination clauses and the principle of sovereignty over maritime areas. 
Nevertheless, in this article, it has been shown that none of the GATT provisions would 
be violated, since the inclusion of ships under the EU ETS constitutes an internal non-
fiscal measure which does not discriminate against foreign products. This non-
discrimination reasoning is also useful to demonstrate that bilateral agreements have not 
been breached. As far as the principle of sovereignty is concerned, and in the light of all 
the considerations above, it seems that there is a sufficient link between the regulated 
situation and the territory of the European Union. 
At the moment of writing, the author is not aware of any final decision on whether 
shipping is to be included under the EU ETS or a different solution is to be tried (taxes, 
voluntary schemes, differentiated port dues, excluding foreign ships from the scheme, 
etc.). However, what this article has attempted to argue is that it should not be the legal 
aspects of the system which deter the Union from including shipping transport under the 
EU ETS. Acknowledging that the battle of legality can be won, it is now for the 
European Institutions to make the politically courageous decision to regulate shipping 
emissions in an efficient and determined way. To do so, it will once again have to batten 
down the hatches and withstand the international political pressure driven by selfish and 
short-term interests. 
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